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History never stops surprising me, mostly by repeating itself.

While gathering material on oral tradition and the Homeric epic, I came across a passage in Plato’s Phaedrus that feels strikingly current. Socrates tells an Egyptian myth. The god Theuth (Thoth) comes to King Thamus — whom the Greeks called Ammon — and shows him his inventions. The most important of them is writing.
Theuth sells it as a remedy for memory and wisdom. Knowledge can now grow beyond the limited capacity of the human brain. Thamus disagrees. The inventor of a technique, he says, is not always the best judge of its consequences. Writing will not strengthen memory but weaken it, because people will stop exercising it. At best it offers the appearance of wisdom.
Read that way, it is an early moment of regulation. Not in the sense of a ban, but in the sense of an authority stepping in between inventor and society and asking: what does this really do to the people who use it? Thamus refuses to take Theuth’s claim at face value.
The irony, of course, is that Plato wrote all of this down. Socrates, who wrote nothing himself and preferred living conversation, gets to say in a book that writing makes memory slack and gives only the appearance of knowledge. The critique of writing survived thanks to writing.
You see the same tension in how we talk about technology today. We tell our children to put their phones away and read more, while we stare at screens all day ourselves. We worry about what AI does to our ability to think, and use AI to put those worries into words. We regulate platforms and algorithms, and we do it through the very digital infrastructure we are trying to steer.
These days Yuval Harari, with his book Nexus, is perhaps the best-known voice among the doomers. The central question of that book: how is it that humanity knows so much more, and seems to use that knowledge only to destroy itself more efficiently? He points to the persecution of the Jews, to failing environmental stewardship, to the way information networks enable cooperation and oppression alike.
That question, however, carries a hidden premise. Humanity also has penicillin, a warm house, clean hands after a visit to the toilet, and a car to drive down a motorway to see family. Knowledge and data have not only produced more efficient forms of violence and destruction; they have also created the material conditions in which far more people live longer and more comfortably.
I see data more as a tool, with a business case, driven by value. Learning to work with it costs something — time, attention, discipline — and in return you get greater cognitive capacity. That was true of writing, of the printing press, of databases, and it is exactly the same in the Age of AI. What you then do with that capacity is another question. Perhaps growing prosperity gives people enough attachment to cherish one another rather than destroy one another more efficiently.
History repeats itself, and irony seems to be the common thread. Every new technology is first hailed as a remedy for memory or knowledge, and then criticised for weakening precisely what it was meant to strengthen. There is always a Theuth saying “this makes us wiser”, and a Thamus asking “what does it really do to us?” Whether we would have been better off without writing, without data, without AI, is another question. Plato, at any rate, wrote the critique down. We are still reading him.
The passage from the Phaedrus (274c–275b)
“Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess.
For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practise their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them.
You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but only appear wise.”
Plato, Phaedrus 274c–275b, after the translation by H.N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library, 1925).